Agreement In Restraint Of Marriage Is Void
- Posted on September 9, 2021
- in Uncategorized
- by admin
English law will advise against agreements that restrict marriage, as they are indigenous to population growth and the moral well-being of citizens. As early as 1768, a precedent was set by the Court of King`s Bench in Lowe v. Peers, where the accused had made a sealed promise not to marry anyone other than the promise she paid him £1,000 within three months of marrying someone else. After selling the good-business or the good-business, the seller retains the right to carry out a competing activity. In the event that a contract provides that the seller does not enter into such an agreement, these rights are extinguished. For example, in today`s world, higher education often extends well beyond the age of majority. If the Commission`s proposal has been respected, a parent can conclude an agreement with his or her child not to marry until they have completed their studies. This would contribute not only to obtaining comprehensive training, but also to the possibility of entering into marriages at a later stage where the parties would be more mature and the chances of a stable marriage would increase. There are two exceptions to section 28, as set out in the act. Agreements limiting judicial proceedings are valid: the Commission thus intends to restrict the scope of the section by classifying as nullity any agreement in a total limitation of marriage, while allowing partial restraint if the limitation thus agreed is considered reasonable by the Tribunal in the circumstances. This would allow for several agreements that could be better for both individuals and society.
In the most recent case of Shrawan Kumar v. Nirmala, the plaintiff, filed an appeal with the Allahabad Supreme Court and asked the court for an injunction on the accused`s marriage to the other person. The applicant argued that the defendant had promised to marry her and that her marriage to the other person should therefore be stopped. Pankaj Mithal, J. cited, in pronouncing his judgment, section 26 of the Indian Contract Act of 1872, thus rejecting the petition. In this case, Thorsten Nordenfelt was a weapons manufacturer in Sweden and England. Thorsten sold his business to a company that later transferred the store to Maxim Nordenfelt. At that time, Thorsten made a deal with Maxim not to manufacture weapons for 25 years, except for what he manufactured on behalf of the company. Subsequently, Thorsten broke his vows by saying that the agreement was not applicable because it keeps trade restricted. The court`s decision was made in Thorsten`s favor. The court noted that “it was not a promise to marry him, but not to marry anyone else, and yet she was not obliged to marry him.” The court found that the contract was void because it was strictly restrictive and contained no promise to continue on either side. Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act cancelled all pro-tanto trade restriction agreements, with the sole exception of the sale of exploitable property or goodwill.
However, it is important to understand that these agreements are non-illegal…